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Foreword
International Economic Law in the Third World
James Thuo Gathii
Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship, Governor George E. Pataki Professor of International
Commercial Law, Albany Law School, Albany, NY, USA

Ibironke Odumosu
Assistant Professor, University of Saskatchewan Law School, Canada

This issue is devoted to International Economic Law in the Third World. The
articles are written from a variety of theoretical, doctrinal and legal perspectives.
It is our sense that issues of international economic law continue to be important
particularly in this early part of the twenty ﬁrst century. Take for example the area
of international arbitration particularly as it relates to investor-State arbitrations.
In the recent past much ink has been poured challenging the closed door and
often secretive nature of the arbitral process, mostly because many international
actors continue to resist transparent arbitral processes. Recently, the Economist
dramatized this critique in an article with the subtitle “A Hard Struggle to Shed
Some Light on a Legal Gray Area.”1 This subtitle is reminiscent of similar critiques leveled at the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement process. In
response to such criticisms there have been a variety of changes to procedural
rules of international arbitration to allow certain public disclosures at various
stages in the arbitral process. Recently, the Abyei Arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, comprised of some of the leading arbitrators in the
world, opened up the proceedings to a live broadcast. Roger Alford has declared
the Abyei Arbitration “a watershed in that it represents one of the most transparent examples of international arbitration in history.”2 Indeed, in some quarters,
there is a growing acceptance of public disclosure particularly in arbitration proceedings involving the public interest. Yet in others, there continues to be a lack
of transparency in the arbitral process.
Beyond public disclosure of information in arbitral proceedings, an even more
topical and knotty subject is a second type of transparency issue that involves the
substantive rules and their applications in arbitration proceedings. This relates to
1)

The Economist, London: Apr. 25, 2009, Vol. 391, Issue 8628; p. 63.
Roger Alford, ‘The Gold Standard of Transparency’ online: Kluwer Arbitration Blog, <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/05/06/the-gold-standard-of-transparency/#more-672>.
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the scope of authority of arbitration tribunals particularly in cases involving sovereign prerogatives and private actors’ commercial interests. In the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, Latin American countries rejected the broad sweep of
international arbitration over such matters and instead subscribed to the Calvo
Clause according to which foreign investors were subject to domestic jurisdiction
just like local investors. While the Calvo Clause fell into disrepute, a renewed
questioning of the legitimacy of arbitral decision-making has led Bolivia and
Ecuador to disown the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States (ICSID Convention). And perhaps, Bolivia
and Ecuador are not alone in this re-awakening considering the movements
that are developing in response to these kinds of mechanisms in most of
Latin America.
Third World Approaches to international economic governance focus on both
types of transparency concerns – procedural and substantive. While the ﬁrst may
be remedied by wide acceptance of public disclosure of information related to
arbitral proceedings, the second may not be as easily disposed of through transparency reforms that only focus on increasing available information during investor-state arbitrations. There still continues to be a need to interrogate the
prerogative of keeping some kinds of information conﬁdential in arbitral proceedings even when there has been progress made in opening up arbitral proceedings in a variety of venues. On the substantive aspect, which may be cast as a
legitimacy issue, the need to explore alternative modes of dispute settlement continues. For example, it may be apposite to establish formal international court
mechanisms to address cases that implicate matters that are constitutional in
nature and extend beyond purely commercial issues. Often, the balancing of the
commercial interests of parties to disputes and the clearly relevant interests of
millions of people sometimes involved in water and sewerage cases, massive economic collapse facing states, wide ranging environmental and health considerations, and so on, seem to extend beyond the ready grasp of ad hoc arbitral
tribunals. As such, Third World Approaches to international economic governance should not only question the suitability of arbitration to deal with these
kinds of cases given the limitations that attend it as a dispute settlement mechanism but also seek alternative international mechanisms and assess emerging
norms in order to respond to challenges facing the system.
Given the importance of these issues and related issues in international economic law, there is a need to revisit them especially at this time of widespread
change in the international legal order. This brief volume touches on some of
these issues. James Gathii’s contribution, “War’s Legacy in International Investment Law,” traces war’s legacy in international commercial law and touches on
many of these issues. For its part, Jalia Kangave’s contribution, “The Dominant
Voices in Double Taxation Agreements: A Critical Analysis of the ‘Dividend’
Article in the Agreement between Uganda and the Netherlands,” highlights the
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imbalances and inequities produced in tax treaties between economically powerful states and Third World countries. Kangave’s paper demonstrates the importance of scholarly contributions from a third world perspective in technical
forums such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) that have long remained crucial forums for discussing and coordinating
international tax issues. For example while the OECD Model Double Tax Treaty
lays down rules and guidelines for the avoidance of double taxation that are used
between developed countries, in practice, these rules often make their way into
negotiations between Third World countries like Uganda and developed countries like the Netherlands. As Kangave further shows, a similar UN-Model Double Tax Treaty also has potentially worrying consequences for Third World
countries. We would anticipate that a UN-Model Treaty may be better for Third
World countries where Third World countries are represented than in the OECD
where they are not, but as Kangave shows this is not the case. The paper shows
quite vividly how the Uganda/Netherlands Double Tax Treaty shifts signiﬁcant
tax revenues away from Uganda – which arguably needs to keep as much revenue
as a least developed country relative to the Netherlands. Perhaps foregoing this
revenue will increase foreign direct investment in Uganda given such incentives
are argued to encourage investors. However, as Kangave shows, there is hardly any
reliable evidence that incentives result in increased investments. As such, revenue
losses arising from extending such incentives may well dwarf their beneﬁts. This
is particularly so in the Uganda/Netherlands Tax Agreement whose dividend provision essentially reduces the tax rate for Dutch investors in Uganda to nil.
In his paper, “Third World Resistance to International Economic and Structural Constraints: Assessing the Utility of the Right to Health in the Context of
the TRIPS Agreement,” Daniel Muriu shows through an analysis of power, resistance and agency, how the right to health has been compromised by leading
economic actors. He argues that it is not enough to merely examine the normative content, justiciability and enforceability of the right to health without concurrently paying attention to what we may refer to as the structural power of
multinational actors.3 In fact, Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL) scholarship has precisely relied on such a combination of both mainstream and critical analysis to expose the manner in which rights such as the right
to health are limited by the very real power exercised by actors with opposing
3)

Susan Strange deﬁnes structural power as having to do with the ability to set “the rules of the game.”
See Conversation With Susan Strange, available at http://www.geocities.com/jt revino41/STRANGE.
DOC (last visited June 4, 2003). Note, she gives the following example of the exercise of structural
power: “An individual like the Pope has structural power because he manages the Catholic Church, and
the Catholic Church, for example, prevents some Catholics from contraception or abortion in their range
of options; so he is exercising structural power.” Id. Susan Strange further argues that it is “only by looking
at the structural power exercised – often unconsciously – over other states, markets, private individuals,
and ﬁrms by the agencies of the United States can the extent of the asymmetries of state power be appreciated.” Susan Strange, ‘The Defective State’, 124 Daedulus 55, 64 (1995).
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interests. Indeed as Muriu concludes, the struggle for the right to health is a
political one that includes not only mobilizing the best legal arguments possible,
but includes the organization and mobilization of concerned individuals and
groups domestically and internationally and not only on the streets but in court
rooms and in a variety of other locations. Such mobilization and organization
would directly engage with the powerful actors who have stood in the way of the
realization of the right to health. Such mobilization and organization of not only
legal arguments but of political action, Wanjau shows, has paid oﬀ dividends in
South Africa following the withdrawal of a suit against South African legislation
by the powerful global pharmaceutical industry that makes it easier for South
Africa to have essential medicines aﬀordable and accessible to South Africans that
need them. In short, this issue provides a variety of insights into some of the most
important challenges facing international economic law as it aﬀects the Third
World today. We hope it inspires even more such work in future to reﬂect on the
multiple similar challenges confronting the Third World.

